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Se7en: Medieval Justice, Modern Justice
VA L E R I E A L L E N

The World’s Iniquity

A

NDREW KEVIN WALKER WROTE THE SCRIPT FOR SE7EN AS A ‘‘CYNICAL

‘love letter’’’ to New York, the dirty, noisy metropolis in which
he spent five years being miserable (Salisbury 86). On its streets,
he watched the seven deadly sins performed daily, and they inspired the
plot of a series of killings—each victim him or herself the perpetrator of
a sin. Detective William Somerset, about to retire, teams up to solve the
case with his young, idealistic replacement, David Mills. On the run
after the detectives’ lucky strike on his apartment, John Doe, the serial
killer, turns himself in after only the fifth murder (gluttony, greed, sloth,
lust, and pride). Luring the detectives with the promise of the last two
bodies (envy and anger), Doe presents Mills with the head of the young
detective’s wife, claiming envy as his besetting sin. Disregarding Somerset’s pleas for restraint, Mills shoots Doe, incarnating himself as wrath,
and completing Doe’s bloody plan. Like Walker, his authorial creator,
John Doe watched the deadly sins performed daily:
DAVID MILLS: I thought all you did was kill innocent people.
JOHN DOE: Innocent? Is that supposed to be funny? An obese
man, a disgusting man, who could barely stand up. . . . A lawyer . . .
who dedicated his life to . . . keeping murderers and rapists on the
street. . . . A drug-dealer, a drug-dealing pederast actually, and let’s
not forget the disease-spreading whore. Only in a world this shitty
could you even try to say these were innocent people and keep a
straight face.1
Whatever the shady activities of the greed, sloth, and lust victims, Fat
Boy (the gluttony victim) committed no crime in overeating, and the
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model none in being proud of her beauty. Secular and ostensibly objective, modern justice no longer purports to interest itself in the
regulation of private morality. Unlike late medieval justice, which had
jurisdiction over the misdeeds of both body and soul by means of the
twin institutions of secular and ecclesiastical law, modern justice takes
care of crime and leaves sin alone.2 But John Doe conflates the two, and
in doing so brings two fundamentally different systems of justice into
unhappy coexistence. He refigures the modern juridical subject by
transforming individual victims into depersonalized types. His relentless offensive against sin exposes ‘‘the world’s iniquity’’ (Dyer, Seven 9)
and questions the tolerance of it by liberal society. In this article, I
consider the vision of the medieval that drives Se7en, namely, its apocalyptic, rationalist, religious, and retributive sense of justice. The distinction between this ‘‘medievalist’’ vision and medieval reality,
whether documentary or literary, is important. What makes Se7en’s
treatment of the medieval exceptional is the way it subverts not only
the ‘‘modern’’ genre of the thriller but also the victim’s subjective
identity, the category of individual that underpins both crime fiction
and criminal psychopathology.
Fincher’s movie has an eschatological force figured in its very title—
Se7en. Seven is the mystical number invoked on every page of the book
of Revelation, the book of end things and of the destruction of time,
measured as human history. Like Umberto Eco’s modern detective
mystery set in the Middle Ages, The Name of the Rose, and made for the
screen (Dir. Jacques Annaud, 1986), Se7en ironically deploys the numerological trope to achieve its apocalyptic finale (Bignell 61 – 85;
Johnston 1 – 32). Whereas in the Name of the Rose, the central preoccupation with the self-referentiality of the sign ultimately liberates
meaning, in Se7en, Detective William Somerset is engulfed by ‘‘too
much evidence’’ for any meaning to emerge (Thompson 122), trapped
in a despairing hermeneutic circle of clues that lead only to more clues.
As the detectives wait on Wednesday night for the results of the
fingerprint match, Somerset muses on the pointlessness of his job.
Despair of making the world a better place has led him to give up and
retire.
All we do is pick up the pieces. We take all the evidence, and all the
pictures and samples. We write everything down, and note what
time things happened . . . We make a nice neat pile, and file it on
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the slim chance it’s ever needed in a courtroom. . . . Even the most
promising clues usually lead only to other clues.
(Walker 60 – 61)

Teleological Design
The dénouement of the Name of the Rose exposes as naı̈ve all faith in any
sure correspondence between the worlds of signs and of things. In
contrast, John Doe’s grand scheme in Se7en triumphantly subordinates
the sign or clue to the controlling design of his grisly oeuvre. Even the
unforeseen snags that occur as the design unfolds itself in reality—the
biggest snag being the detectives’ lucky if illicit strike against Doe’s
apartment (Burt 44 – 45)—can be worked into the ideal exemplar. In
fact, it can even become a felix culpa, a happy fault that renders the
outcome better than the killer’s original intention. The effete ‘‘postmodern’’ world encapsulated in Somerset’s world-weary cynicism,
which generates its own twinned contrary in the naı̈ve optimism of
Detective David Mills, is trumped by the revenge of the medieval, by a
world in which there is a grand plan, all signs point to it, and neither
detective can derail its fulfillment. The repeated motif of the number
seven in minor details (Somerset’s dinner date with Mills and his wife
Tracy and Doe’s delivery of the head-in-the-box are both scheduled for
seven o’clock) persistently reminds the viewer of a pattern larger than
any individual that draws to completion. Seven represents one revolution of the cycle of history, one turn of the wheel of fortune. There are
seven intervals in a chord, seven days of the week, Seven Wonders of
the World. Seven is the number of completion; if it represents the end
of something, it also represents a beginning. In medieval numerology,
seven is the number that governs the entire span of human life (Macrobius 99 – 117, especially 112), and, in being the sum of odd and even
(three and four), it is a number that represents all numbers (Augustine
11.31 [552 – 57]), just as the city in which the action takes place
represents every city, just as John Doe represents the medieval morality
figure Everyman, and just as the seven deadly sins subsume within
them all other possible sins, which is a commonplace of medieval
devotional treatises (Ancrene Wisse IV.392 – 95 [232]). The revelation
toward which the plot progresses turns this ‘‘perfectly good’’ thriller
into a horror movie (Swallow 69) with a presence as malignant as that
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portrayed in Alien3 (Dir. David Fincher, 1992). Despite this turn to
horror as the malice of Doe’s intentions become clear, the movie’s
universe of intelligent cause is, as Richard Dyer observes, strangely
‘‘reassuring,’’ even ‘‘old fashioned’’ in comparison with, for example,
Henry, Portrait of a Serial Killer (Dir. John McNaughton, 1986), which
offers no explanations for what the killer does, no behavioral deviance,
no woman blaming; or to Kalifornia (Dir. Dominic Sena, 1993), the
basic premise of which is that ‘‘serial killing is just a lot of killing done
for different, practical reasons by the same person’’ (Dyer, ‘‘Kill and
Kill Again’’ 16). It is ultimately Se7en’s ideal form that makes this
movie ‘‘medieval,’’ that is, according to a modern popularist vision of
the medieval: monolithically rationalist, intolerantly religious, and
retributive.
The question is not whether the movie offers a historically accurate
picture of the Middle Ages, for it patently does not: western medieval
law distinguished carefully between ecclesiastical and secular wrongdoing, and between natural and human law; medieval legal codes may
have included elements of retribution but not to the exclusion of any
other means of amendment (e.g., monetary compensation); judicial
torture was reserved for special cases; and a providential order was as
much or little in evidence then as it is today. The question is rather
why and how these images, translated into modern cinematic parlance,
sum up the ethos of what it is to ‘‘get medieval,’’ or ‘‘get medieval on
your ass’’—a phrase Pulp Fiction immortalized (Dinshaw 116 – 17). If it
is true that ‘‘the medieval represents things that can’t be eradicated’’
(Dinshaw 122 – 23), then we must think hard about the contradiction
that religion, sin, retribution, and torture appear to have formally
disappeared from the modern legal and penal system, that Se7en’s depiction of ‘‘medieval’’ justice is more accurately a dark fantasy about
what present justice is not.

Good Cop, Bad Cop: Virgil, Dante
Fincher admits to an initial uninterest in Se7en because the first few
pages of the script seemed to promise ‘‘just another buddy movie’’
(Dyer, Seven 24). The subsequent pages, however, defy that expectation,
despite the deepening relationship between the two men. The movie’s
extensive allusion to the famous poem of the Middle Ages, Dante’s
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Commedia, in particular, its Inferno and Purgatorio, includes a certain
similitude between the relationship between the two detectives and
that between Virgil and Dante. Permitted to be Dante’s guide through
Inferno and as far as the Earthly Paradise in Purgatorio, Virgil represents
human reason in all its profound wisdom sans the illumination of grace
(Purgatorio xviii.46 – 48). Dante plays passion to Virgil’s reason, and,
especially at the beginning of the poem, undergoes Virgil’s chastisement as he slowly learns to master his emotions. Somerset’s gravitas
well captures the famous sadness Virgil wears (Inferno iv), and the
detective’s intelligence is highlighted throughout.
The detectives’ reembodiment of rational Virgil and passionate Dante
becomes most pointed on Thursday. Frustrated by the realization that
Victor is not the murderer but the sloth victim, Mills curses outside
Victor’s apartment. Somerset stresses the need to ‘‘divorce ourselves from
emotions’’ (Walker 70), but Mills waves him off, claiming that he feeds
off those emotions. He then gets involved in a fight with a journalist,
who we later learn is the killer. Watching the ugly display that will prove
to be Mills’s downfall, Somerset coldly observes: ‘‘It’s always impressive to
see a man feeding off his emotions’’ (Walker 72). This is just one of many
Virgilian rebukes in the movie, yet just as the bond between Virgil and
Dante deepens (Inferno xxiii.25 – 27), so does the friendship between
Somerset and Mills. Staring through the precinct’s two-way mirror at
John Doe in the interrogation room, Mills observes that the killer is
merely playing with them. ‘‘You and I,’’ replies Somerset, ‘‘are for the first
time ever, in total agreement’’ (Walker 119).
Dante’s theme is redemption, a quality Fincher’s movie noticeably
lacks. If Mills mimics Dante, and Somerset Virgil, it is ironic that it is
Mills who is lost, and Somerset who is, in a way, saved, although that
‘‘salvation’’—indicated by Somerset’s decision to stay in the force and
his closing quote from Ernest Hemingway—was a reluctant afterthought (‘‘The Story’’ audio commentary on DVD; Swallow 78). Had
Fincher had his druthers, he would have kept to the original test
ending, recorded as an alternate ending in Disk 2 of the DVD, in
which after Mills kills Doe with a single shot, the screen fades to black.
Yet the Hemingway quote does not alleviate the despair of the ending;
unlike Dante’s Commedia, the movie lacks a salvific plan.
Somerset and Mills are carefully differentiated from each other by a
wealth of contrastive background detail: one is older and about to
retire, the other a rookie on his way up. Somerset’s spectacles indicate
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learning and wisdom as well as his advanced years; he carries a goodquality pen, Mills uses one with a nude girl painted on the side.
Dining at Tracy and Mills’s apartment, Somerset drinks wine, Mills
beer (Burt 40). Somerset carries an old-fashioned gun that rarely leaves
its holster, while Mills is always happy to whip out his more powerful
and modern piece. The precredit opening sequence of the movie deftly
draws Somerset within seconds: he is meticulously neat, solitary, and
intellectual (a chessboard sits in the foreground as he washes the
dishes). Monday’s dawn draws a pen portrait of Mills as Somerset’s
contrary in a counterpoint scene that plays with reversed mirror images
(Scannwald 134 – 36): he is noisy, his shirt rumpled, he sticks his head
through a preknotted tie selected from a hanger-full of them, he drinks
soda from a can opened the night before, the place is a mess.
But Mills awakes with a beautiful woman in his arms, who knew
from their first date in high school that she would marry him.
Somerset’s sometime relationship did not work out, and at nights he
sleeps in a single bed as solitary as John Doe’s. Tracy is pregnant,
Somerset boasts only a sometime abortion. Even the guns have phallic
symbolism: something of a limp dick, Somerset has never fired his
old-fashioned weapon, while trigger-happy Mills empties his clip into
Doe.3 As Somerset, the thinker, sits overwhelmed amidst piles of Doe’s
journals, Mills, the man of action, takes charge when the phone rings.
Somerset’s powerlessness is most apparent at the close of the movie, in
which he understands but cannot intervene, leaving no obstacle to
Mills’s anger. In an alternate ending, never shot, but mocked up on
pasteboards, the fatal shot that kills Doe comes from the gun of
Somerset, who announces to the astonished Mills, ‘‘I’m retiring.’’ This
alternative shows Somerset in a proactive role, but it was not Fincher’s
final choice. Instead, all the futile understanding Somerset carries in
that ‘‘big brain’’ of his results in no action, and is not powerful enough
to detract Mills from revenge (Arnold 46). Like Dante’s Virgil, he
understands, but too late to do anything about it.
The analogy with the Virgil/Dante relationship is only one facet of a
relationship between figures that cannot be restricted to personification. Other important differences between the two men—for example,
their color—give complexity and resonance to their growing friendship, and many critics argue that Somerset demonstrates a morally
authentic black identity (Dyer, Seven 39 – 40; Gormley 155 – 71;
Tambling 300). But in the context of justice, the allusion to Dante’s
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poem is striking, for this is a work preeminent among its peers for its
sustained consideration of giustizia (justice), not only at the level of
divine law, punishment, and reward, but also as a cosmic law of motion. The contrariety between the two detectives in a curious way
reduces rather than exaggerates the difference between the two, just as
the spendthrifts and misers in circle four of Inferno receive punishments
so symmetrically aligned that they seem mirror images of each other. It
is this principle of symmetry and counterpoint that brings us closest to
the spirit of Dantesque poetic justice.

Contrapasso
The seven deadly sins, as Dante explains them in Purgatorio, are schematized as instances of love abused in some way: lust, gluttony, and
avarice represent excessive love; sloth represents deficient love; and pride,
envy, and anger represent love misdirected. A diagram of Purgatorio’s plan
is even included as an inset in the actual script (Walker 36), and photocopied by Somerset in the library. This image, along with shots of
Gustave Doré’s nineteenth-century illustrations of the Commedia, is placed
as a sign that reveals a rigorously planned taxonomy and rationalization of
sin. In Dante’s moral landscape, all human actions are accountable to
reason, leaving no excluded domain for gratification of private vices; every
act bears global repercussions. Most of all, justice asserts itself as a cosmic
or divine principle, transcending the distinction between acts injurious to
the public welfare (crime) and those injurious to God (sin), demanding
virtue in every corner of life, and holding the sinner accountable for the
flouting of any law, human or divine.
Mercy, however, lies at the center of that medieval cosmic law. Dante’s
penal schema distinguishes between punishment that perpetuates the sin
(in Inferno) and penitence that expunges it (in Purgatorio). Although the
sinners of Purgatorio, like those of Inferno, in some measure have to reenact
their sin, it is only in Purgatorio that their sin is purged by its true Other,
virtue: gluttony by temperance, lust by chastity, pride by humility, envy
by kindness, anger by gentleness, sloth by zeal, avarice by generosity. But
in hell, justice decrees that the sinners—who rejected the chance to
repent—should reenact their sin for eternity.
Se7en’s shots of Doré’s illustrations cluster around one particular canto,
xxviii, in which the schismatics are punished for sundering the natural
bonds within human society. This canto is key in Inferno in spelling out one
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aspect of the poem’s retributive method. Mahomet—sunderer of the Christian church—is disemboweled, with his trunk rent from chin to crotch, and
Bertran de Born speaks from a head severed from the trunk and held in his
hand. Bertran is guilty of fomenting the revolt of Prince Henry against his
royal father Henry II of England. Having turned son against father, the
‘‘head’’ of the family, and prince against king, the ‘‘head’’ of the realm,
Bertran loses his own head in punishment, and holds it up as the perfect
example of contrapasso (xxviii.142). This is the only use of the word in the
Commedia yet for many critics it encapsulates the essence of Inferno’s method
of poetic justice, and has even been applied to the punishments of Purgatorio
(Armour 1 – 3). In Italian, contrapasso is a nonce word, and its exact meaning
continues to be debated, although few would disagree with describing it as
‘‘the state of having experienced, felt, or suffered in return, in exchange.’’4
Inferno’s retributive principle can be understood broadly as a countermotion
that in some way mirrors the sin. Contrapasso sums up the principle of
retaliation, emphasizing that all ‘‘seminators’’ (xxviii.35) of sin will reap
what they sow (Galations 6.8). Cast in terms of punition theory, contrapasso
fulfils the requirement that ‘‘the action which constitutes punishment for an
offense should possess some or all of the characteristics that made the offense
wrong’’ (Waldron 35).
In the judicial schema of Se7en, bereft of all mercy, John Doe,
scourge of God, merely took the sins to ‘‘logical conclusions’’ (Walker
160). Retribution replaces mercy in this malignant providence. Doe
similarly punishes the sinners by making them reenact their sin, dying
as they lived (the glutton by eating, the sluggard by inactivity, the
lecher by having sex, the angry man by killing) or by making them the
receiver rather than doer of the action (the avaricious man is bled dry),
or by contrariety (the proud woman is disfigured). Doe might equally
have starved the glutton or worked the sluggard to death. It barely
matters whether punishment is meted out by more of the same or the
contrary of the sin, which is simply the same sin in negated form. Doe’s
punishments compound the evil, aggravating sin with crime; they do
not restore balance, as do the penances of Purgatorio.
Most of Inferno’s punishments are the product of fantasy, but some
punishments in canto xxviii are reminiscent of historical methods of
public execution—dismemberment, disembowelment, and decapitation (Olson 63). Mahomet’s disembowelment and Bertran de Born’s
decapitation are the frequent price for high treason. Consider the execution in 1305 of Scottish rebel William Wallace, condemned as
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outlaw and traitor: his internal organs, ‘‘whence his perverted thoughts
proceeded’’ [a quibus tam perversae cogitationes processerunt] were
ripped out and burnt in front of him. And, in view of the fact that he
had plotted ‘‘not only against the lord king himself but also the entire
people of England and Scotland,’’ he was quartered, his head being
displayed in (the ‘‘capital’’ city of ) London, and his four quarters in the
far corners of the realm—Newcastle upon Tyne, Berwick, Stryvelyn
(Stirling), and St. Johnstone (Perth) (Stevenson 192 – 93; also Olson
70 – 71). For once, Dante did not need to embroider legal imaginations
that waxed poetic for such capital offenses.
Contemporary cinematic culture is fascinated with the retributive energy of ‘‘getting medieval’’: like Se7en, Pulp Fiction (Dir. Quentin Tarantino, 1994), and Hannibal (Dir. Ridley Scott, 2001) employ a Gothic
trope to depict a rough justice that is, in Hannibal’s case, arguably more
just than what we have now. Hannibal Lecter, a serial killer on the loose,
delivers a lecture at the Capponi Library in Florence on the link of avarice
between two suicides by hanging: Pier delle Vigne in Dante’s seventh
circle of hell and Judas Iscariot, betrayer of Christ. Placing his hand on
the shoulder of Inspector Pazzi (a play on ‘‘patsy’’), a Judas figure who has
just ‘‘sold’’ Hannibal for US$100,000, Lecter announces the man’s execution sentence even as he lectures. The act of touching registers how
law leaves its mark on the body (Hibbitts 927 – 34), for ‘‘torture . . . must
mark the victim’’ (Foucault, Discipline 34). Pazzi is summarily hanged
outside the walls of the library, exactly where his forefather Francesco
Pazzi was hanged in Renaissance Florence five centuries earlier, and with
his giblets dangling, just like Judas Iscariot. In this and his subsequent
sentence enacted on Paul Krendler of the Justice department, Lecter the
serial killer, aesthete, epicure, and scholar of the medieval shows a sharper
sense of poetic justice than do the administrators of the law. Lacking
Lecter’s exquisite manners, Fincher’s John Doe presents a more chilling
embodiment of retribution in casting the shadow of accountability on
every sinner, every spectator (Burt 46).

Darkness Visible
Dante’s ratiocinative scheme brings illumination, enlightenment, but
what has been called the ‘‘colour noir’’ (Darke 19 – 20) aesthetic of
the movie becomes a metaphysical darkness that stands for loss of
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enlightenment and for hell itself. ‘‘Oh, very moody,’’ says the coroner
on flicking the light switch to no effect in Gluttony’s apartment. The
movie’s absence of light is informed as much by developing technology
as it is by metaphysics. By a process called resilvering or silver retention, whereby the silver that is ordinarily taken out of film is retained, an ‘‘oligochromatic’’ spectrum of closely related colors results:
textured, varied blacks, dirty greens, brown, beige, ochre, slate, gray,
cream, white (‘‘The Picture’’ audio commentary on DVD; Dyer, Seven
62). No natural light enters the apartments of Gluttony, Sloth, or Doe,
and the continuous storm clouds and pelting rain create the sense that
‘‘there wasn’t any escape,’’ for the darkness is as bad outside as it is
within (Dyer, Seven 63; Scannwald 132 – 34). Only harsh fluorescence or
the red neon of the brothel cuts through the gloaming; they take away
the blindness but enable no insight. This is the lighting of hell, where,
in the words of a poet quoted by John Doe,
. . . From those flames
No light, but rather darkness visible
Serv’d onely to discover sights of woe.
(Milton, Paradise Lost I.62 – 64 [356])
Darkness operates as the metaphysical privation of light just as evil is
the privation of the good, at least according to orthodox Christian
theology. Darkness visible is the world in which all these characters
move, excepting perhaps the warm lighting of Mills’s and Tracy’s
apartment where there is some love and happiness. It also stands for
ignorance and lack of understanding, again broken in one scene where
Somerset seeks enlightenment in the library. Striving toward an entirely black screen, the movie ‘‘could never be dark enough,’’ observes
production designer Arthur Max (Swallow 71); or as Fincher asks,
‘‘How do we make black black?’’ (‘‘The Picture’’ audio commentary on
DVD).
Beyond the technology of film noir, the movie takes the idea of not
being able to see to a radical extreme. It makes some concessions to
Hollywood’s love of gore, showing the corpses of most of the victims,
and the living skeleton of Sloth (Victor) is a grisly achievement of
make-up art applied to a real actor. But the shots of Gluttony (‘‘Fat
Boy’’) are taken at a distance, and we never do get to have a really good
look, at least in the film itself. In the supplemental material on Disk 2
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of the DVD, one does get the opportunity to feast the eyes on the still
photographs designed to be John Doe’s album of the killing of Gluttony and Greed—after the raid on Doe’s apartment, of course, the
photos cease. The deaths are recorded in graphic detail. Looking at
their distress, we begin to relate to Gluttony and Greed as real men.
The only shots, however, that figure in the actual movie are of the
progressive wasting of Sloth. The film decorously turns a blind eye to
all the horror recorded in its photographed subconscious. Most of all,
we are cheated out of the suspense sequences with their delicious threat
of torture. The lens that mimics the eye of the killer stalking his
victims is a threadbare cliché of suspense, but the genre demands it and
we enjoy it nonetheless. However, we never follow Doe stalking his
victims; none of the deaths is foreshadowed (Arnold 43). We arrive
along with the detectives at the crime scene with the murder already a
fait accompli. The movie’s refusal to enact suspense also explains the
chance detection of the killer (quite unacceptable in a thriller), who
gives himself up (even more unacceptable) and does so unseasonably
early, in the third act—a surprise move that wrenched a ‘‘Holy shit!’’
out of Fincher when he first read the script (Salisbury 81).
Se7en’s resistance to voyeurism induces what Kirsten Thompson calls
‘‘scopic dread,’’ a fascination with and repulsion at scenes ‘‘too terrible
for sight’’ (124 – 25), and in doing so it puts us in touch with an
aesthetic much older than the thriller. Consider Greek tragedy, whose
bloody acts—Medea’s murder of her sons, Jocasta’s and Antigone’s
suicides by hanging, Oedipus’s self-blinding, Haemon’s suicide—all
happen offstage, being related as events already having taken place. A
certain static quality and inevitability are intrinsic to both Greek
tragedy and the near-plotless medieval morality play, such as Everyman.
Without any formal grasp of classical allusion, Fincher intuited the
radical aesthetic shift at work:
From the time he opens the box . . . it’s like you realize that the end
of the movie’s been written in stone and it’s been there for like eight
or nine hours and you don’t have any choice. The big sequence in the
third act of most movies, . . . the window being opened in the back
and the woman drawing the bath . . . this script doesn’t even care
about that, because it’s already happened ten hours ago . . . All of a
sudden it becomes . . . a morality play, it becomes about confronting
evil.
(Swallow 68 – 69)
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Se7en sets that antisuspense into the heart of a thriller. As the movie
approaches its climactic final temptation of Mills, we hope that something will rescue us from the growing despair, that somehow he will
overcome the rage and thwart Doe’s plan, but the hope is vain. Mills
has many strengths, but nothing in his behavior suggests he has the
moral resources to pass this test. Fincher experimented with a number
of different versions for the final scene—Somerset shooting Doe, Somerset shooting Mills to stop him shooting Doe—but actor Brad Pitt,
who went out on a limb by refusing to take the role unless they stuck
to the original ending of the head-in-the-box, understood that Mills
had to be the one to kill Doe. The scene, he said, was ‘‘everything it’s
been leading up to’’ (Swallow 68, 80 – 81). The ideal form that is
central to the movie’s conception of the medieval demands teleological
closure.

Wax Sculptures
The victims die variously and painfully: force feeding, exsanguination,
muscular atrophy, rape by a serrated steel dildo. Their crimes are
written in the byproduct of their own sins: avarice in blood, gluttony
in grease, sloth in shit. With the first murder (gluttony), Somerset
immediately understands that this is no ordinary killing, for it took
some twelve hours: ‘‘you don’t risk the time it takes to do this unless
the act itself has meaning’’ (Walker 23). Somerset follows up clues that
others ignore, and understands that these murders are about sin. Both
he and the murderer understand ‘‘the world’s iniquity’’; but to Mills,
the murderer is simply insane, for it is incomprehensible to him that
one could plan so methodically, kill so slowly and sadistically, yet have
no personal grudge, no feelings other than contempt and a certain
aesthetic gratification.
SOMERSET: It’s dismissive to call him a lunatic. Don’t make that
mistake.
MILLS: Oh blah, blah, blah. This guy’s insane; right now he’s
probably dancing around in his room in a pair of his mommy’s
panties, singing show tunes and rubbing himself with peanut
butter.
SOMERSET: He’s methodical, exacting, and worst of all, he’s
patient.
MILLS: He’s a nutbag.5
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The rest of the force agrees with Mills. Doe has given himself to them
on a plate, yet none of the forces of crime prevention and detection can
learn anything from either his person or home (Arnold 45). His given
name is John Doe: he has no known history, no bank accounts, no
friends, no fingerprints, no perceivable motive, no witnesses to his
crimes, in short, no criminal etiology. As the Captain helplessly concludes, ‘‘the only thing we know about that guy right now is he’s
independently wealthy, well educated, and totally insane’’ (Se7en ch.
29). Even the vocabulary of psychopathy used by the police force is
impoverished: ‘‘lunatic,’’ ‘‘nutbag,’’ ‘‘insane,’’ ‘‘mentally ill,’’ ‘‘fucking
crazy,’’ ‘‘freak.’’
‘‘Victim’’ is a term we use reluctantly to describe some of the sleazier
decedents, such as Victor and particularly Doe, who also is a victim, yet
modern criminal parlance has no way to distinguish the deserving from
the undeserving ‘‘victim,’’ for, in contrast to the medieval outlaw, the
modern felon is ‘‘in’’ the law, and therefore protected by it, even when
incarcerated. The first five objects of Doe’s crusade are not individuated
but presented as moral types, pure exemplars of single sins. Sloth
(Victor) best illustrates this principle. The Captain, thinking him the
killer, gives his biographical profile, and the sequence, from the fingerprint match to the moment when the sheet is pulled off to reveal
Victor, occupies a full five minutes of viewing time. With a build-up
like that, it is all the more striking that on unveiling him, California
the cop should exclaim, ‘‘he’s some kind of friggin’ wax sculpture or
something’’ (Walker 68). Fincher claims his inspiration for Victor from
Goth videos of the band Nine Inch Nails, and he told the ‘‘awesome
fucking genius’’ Rob Bottin, special effects artist, to ‘‘go mad’’
(Swallow 71). What strikes the medievalist’s eye is the similarity between Victor and the sculptured figures we see, for example, on cadaver
or transi-tombs, such as the one of Archbishop Chichele in Canterbury
Cathedral (Figure 1). Note the same wasted face and sharply contoured
bone structure (Figures 2 and 3).
The point of a double-decker tomb such as Chichele’s is to depict
the dead man in all his pomp on the top tier, as he looked in life, and
underneath as a decaying cadaver. The double image teaches us to mind
not the individuated flesh on the surface but the generic skeleton lying
beneath. Victor is a nice touch of designer Goth, but the ‘‘friggin’ wax
sculpture’’ also deflects attention away from Victor as this individual
man, some mother’s son. When Bertran de Born holds up his head and
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FIGURE 1. The Chichele Tomb. Circa 1425. Used with permission of the Dean
and Chapter, Canterbury Cathedral, England.

closes canto xxviii with the resonant words—‘‘In me the contrapasso is
observed’’ (Cosı̀ s’osserva in me lo contrapasso) (Inferno xxviii.142)—the
use of the impersonal construction arrests us. The grammatical subject
of the sentence is not Bertran but contrapasso, retribution, retaliation.
Bertran becomes the ‘‘patient’’ (from L. pati, to suffer) upon which
impersonal justice enacts itself. Agency belongs to abstract justice

FIGURE 2. The Chichele Tomb. Circa 1425. Used with permission of the
Dean and Chapter, Canterbury Cathedral, England. (Detail reversed for
comparison.)
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FIGURE 3.

r New Line Productions.

rather than to criminal or executioner, penitent or priest. As the camera
lens closes in on Victor, the victim, individual and possessor-of-rights,
as we know him, is erased.
And so is the killer as individual. Doe ‘‘plays’’ envy for the dénouement, but no one is fooled for the simple reason that Doe has shown
himself entirely in control throughout, and it makes little sense that he
should be in the grip of jealousy for Mills’s ‘‘life of the simple man.’’
The plot makes provision for this, because what we are watching is
Doe’s improvised, makeshift ending; we never do get to see the master
plan in its original production—another way in which the movie teases
us with what we may not see. Therefore, we accept Doe’s acting a part
in his own drama, although it only further renders us incapable of
understanding any ‘‘real’’ self beneath the extempore charade of envy.
Doe remains psychologically unfathomable.

Alien Justice
For Kevin Spacey, acting Doe, his character is a ‘‘bad, bad man, truly
evil’’ (Swallow 75), and this is as far as we get in terms of what the
movie allows us to understand of him. Somerset possesses the deepest
understanding of Doe’s nature by virtue of a shared misanthropy and
intellectualism. In the car ride to the final scene, he shakes Doe’s
composure momentarily by uncovering the killer’s baser motive of
pleasure.
See, if you were chosen as if by some higher power, and your hand
was forced . . . well . . . then, it’s strange you took so much pleasure
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in it. You enjoyed torturing your victims. That’s not really in
keeping with martyrdom, is it?
(Walker 129)
That is the nearest we get to any psychological truth about Doe,
leaving us stuck with ‘‘evil,’’ a word that, as Benedict Carey observes,
has been excised from medical science because it confuses clinical diagnosis with moral, even religious, value judgment (1). Yet for some
forensic psychiatric professionals, the term effectively registers the kind
of sadism that goes off the Richter scale of ‘‘normal’’ psychopathy,
rendering the criminal ‘‘too far gone’’ for treatment or rehabilitation
(Stone 304). The debate exposes a blind spot in medico-juridical science, which, in accordance with its positivist methodology, only defines
behaviors it can measure. Evil, not subject to measurement, has no
scientific standing. It is a common enough trope in serial killer movies
that the serial killer is both product and critic of modern society (Dyer,
Seven 37). Doe fits the formula here as God’s scourge who punishes
what ‘‘a world this shitty’’ countenances as private life choice. But in
his complete lack of individuating circumstance—he literally becomes
John Doe, the North American term for an unidentified male corpse—
and in the transmutation of victim into depersonalized exemplar, the
movie takes social critique further to reveal the alien within modern
justice. In Alien,3 science fiction allows Fincher the context to explore
difference in extremis, difference that destroys us the minute we meet it.
In Se7en, we encounter an alienness that—if it seems more mundane—
more profoundly disturbs because it lives next door.
It is disturbing indeed to acknowledge the irrelevance of motive,
and even more so to unthink Doe’s targets as ‘‘innocent people’’ or
‘‘victims.’’ We intuitively resist the reduction of a human individual to
an exemplar, of moral temperament to any single passion or sin. Jeremy
Tambling takes issue with both Dante’s and Doe’s ability ‘‘to provide a
reading of people in terms of the seven deadly sins’’ (299); while for
Elisabeth Bronfen (1 – 18), Somerset is the moral touchstone of the
movie because he refuses allegorical reductions, and insists on the need
for ‘‘the difficult task of understanding another human being’’ (15).
Different again is the concept of persona, a discursive construction of
marketing strategies and actor cachet that exist alongside conventional
characterizations internal to the story (Scott). Such reduction to abstraction disturbs because it compromises some hard won liberal beliefs
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in human nature, confronting us with Michel Foucault’s claim that
‘‘man’’ is an ideological construction of individualism, ‘‘only a recent
invention, a figure not yet two centuries old’’ who ‘‘will disappear again
as soon as that knowledge has discovered a new form’’ (Order xxiii).
Foucault’s ‘‘recent invention’’ of man coincides with the shift he tracks
in Discipline and Punish from ‘‘a real body capable of feeling pain’’ to a
more abstract selfhood, the ‘‘juridical subject,’’ whose punishment
occurs at one remove from physical trauma (Discipline 13). Far from
being juridical subjects, Doe’s first five victims lack individuating
personality to the exact degree that they possess real bodies capable of
feeling pain. As they sinned in the flesh so they must pay in the
flesh: Fat Boy’s (Gluttony’s) death-by-eating takes some twelve hours,
Victor’s (Sloth’s) inertia a year, and the chair of Eli Gould (Greed) is
soaked through with sweat as he decides which pound of his flesh is
expendable.
At issue in this ‘‘alien’’ penality of retribution exacted on the body is
a different technology of the self, standard of evidence, and form of
justice—one founded on a general probability of truth rather than
specific empirical data. That probability is well illustrated in Aristotle’s handbook of forensic persuasion, Rhetoric, where he anatomizes
human behavior by means of familiar character types: the young man,
old man, man in his prime, his appropriate virtues, his appropriate
vices, whether he is well born, rich, powerful, or not (II.12 – 17,
1388b – 91b [246 – 63]). At first, maybe these types seem to differ
little in principle from criminal and psychopathic profiles used by
forensic analysts every day, but there is only a superficial likeness of
generality. Aristotle’s types are fixed exemplars of human nature drawn
from a common stock of local experience, whom the Athenian citizens
would recognize as personalities who live next door, as self-evidently
true, without need of demonstrative proof. Contemporary criminal and
psychopathic profiles, on the other hand, appeal not to common intuitions but are built painstakingly from professional research, the
summation of thousands of case studies, taken as provisionally ‘‘true,’’
but not self-evident, and ever open to revision in light of new data, for
‘‘cases are always hypotheses’’ (Walton 122).
Aristotle’s forensic typology is analogous to the ideal form of disease
Foucault identifies in preclinical medicine, in which the disease rather
than the patient is the object of study and treatment, and in which the
patient is almost incidental to the disease (Foucault, Birth 8 – 9).
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Although, like medicine, forensic rhetoric applies to this or that individual, it nonetheless yields general rather than specific knowledge:
‘‘rhetoric will not consider what seems probable in each individual case,
. . . but that which seems probable to this or that class of persons’’
(Aristotle I.2, 1356b [22 – 23], my italics). Contrast this disregard of
individual circumstance with the preeminent role of the psychiatric
case study, a research method in which (in clinical research) one
particular individual is studied closely and all observations recorded
meticulously. The individual case is selected precisely for its simultaneous particularity and generalizability, for the extent to which it can
be analogized with other cases of the same theoretical model. From
such paradigmatic case studies, hypotheses are drawn, and previous
assumptions affirmed, falsified, or modified by working from stable
specifics repeated across a range of comparable cases. Once we have
identified certain patterns of behavior that remain consistent, we build
the profiles of psychopathic types. General characteristics of such personality profiles—however situated they are within individual narratives—ultimately require the accumulated weight of traits duly
observed and tallied into statistical probability. In contrast, the types
drawn from Aristotle’s underlying theory of probability are not statistically derived but appeal to a general notion of human nature,
commonsensical, reasonable in itself, not subject to the ordeal of statistical proof. If such characterizations, upon which legal judgments are
based, seem open to dispute, remember that rhetorical proof is not the
deductive proof of a geometric theorem but rather offers probable
rather than necessary truth.6
In an Aristotelian universe filled with the sunshine of reason,
deviance does not possess independent ontological status. There is
little interest in understanding mental disorder and criminal mentality
for its own sake, in seeking ‘‘medico-juridical treatment’’ (Foucault,
Discipline 22) for the likes of John Doe. For modern psychiatry,
however,
[t]he question is no longer simply: ‘‘Has the act been established and
is it punishable?’’ But also: ‘‘What is this act, what is this act of
violence or this murder? . . . Is it a phantasy, a psychotic reaction, a
delusional episode, a perverse action?’’ It is no longer simply: ‘‘Who
committed it?’’ But: . . . Where did it originate in the author himself? Instinct, unconscious, environment, heredity?
(Foucault, Discipline 19)
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The Enlightenment view of human nature as ‘‘essentially free, reasonable, and inclined to virtue’’ (Halttunen 43) conceives of crime as
moral deviance, and calls for its explanation in terms of environmental
influence and personal motive. In a subsequent, ‘‘vanilla’’ version of
Se7en, which usefully tracks concessions to Hollywood that neither
Walker’s original script nor the film version made, Doe is given some
shadow of motive through hints at an abusive childhood in a Catholic
orphanage where he received vicious punishment for sin (Swallow 77).
This is not to imply that motive was never sought to explain crime in
the Middle Ages, but the mechanism for such interrogation of private
thoughts lay more in penitential than judicial discourse, the therapeutic management of wrongdoing occurring for the most part in a
religious context. This premodern construction of the felon as ‘‘common sinner’’ rather than ‘‘moral alien’’ (Halttunen 35) opens a space for
forgiveness, explaining the reaction—unthinkable today—of the large
crowd that wept and prayed for the soul of Gilles de Rais, who was
executed in 1440 for the abduction, rape, sodomization, torture, and
murder of dozens if not hundreds of children (Bataille 278 – 79).
Scrutiny of the criminal killer as moral alien requires that ‘‘his’’
childhood and unspoken desires be probed relentlessly to explain his
deviant behavior. In line with Foucault’s depiction of nineteenthcentury reorganization of sexual knowledge (Foucault, History 45),
subjectivity is conflicted by a double drive: desire for self-knowledge,
for spying out dark truths buried within individual experience; and the
mind’s endless resistance to detection. One can thus never be vigilant
enough in reading the clues. The detective genre itself exists in a
universe in which truth stands in its own shadow, meaning is never
transparent, and signs are always double. Detective fiction is the literary expression par excellence of the psychoanalytic subject. However
much detective thrillers offer narratives of closure, the true hermeneutic work of detection is never finished, and other possibilities always
glimmer beyond the last one—hence the Hollywood motif of the afterthe-verdict discovery of the real murderer, as in, for example, Jagged
Edge (Dir. Richard Marquand, 1985) or Presumed Innocent (Dir. Alan J.
Pakula, 1990). By disallowing all hermeneutic and psychoanalytic insight into his own personality, and by transforming his first five targets
from ‘‘victims’’ into moral types, John Doe presents an alienness of a
different order that refuses the very premise of detection. In a skillful
yoking of genre with cinematography, the movie disallows mystery
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even as it obstructs us from seeing. Suspense is itself suspended in this
thriller, because the outcome is already decided. It is little surprise that
producer Arnold Kopelson, on first viewing Se7en, complained that
Fincher had taken ‘‘a perfectly good genre movie and turned it into a
foreign film’’ (Swallow 83; also Blair 18). The detective impulse requires shadows and darkness (Halttunen 120 – 26), which, at the end of
the movie and in reversal of Dante’s infernal imagery, are thrown aside
to reveal hell’s bottom as a wide open, flat desert full of blinding
sunshine. The shadows at least allowed some hope, but disappear in the
apocalyptic landscape of this final scene.
After the fungal greens, filthy browns and inky blacks that dominate
the film, the wasteland light of the brilliantly handled conclusion—
where the mise en sce`ne’s combination of distance and proximity, of
space and enclosure, emphasises an overriding helplessness—is not
that of clarity and redemption but that of blinding, disorientating
bleakness.
(Darke 20)
The grim ‘‘medievalism’’ operative in Se7en relates to present reality
not as discrete historical era but as an unspeakable presence within, as
the presence of a retaliatory justice that modern justice no longer
allows itself officially to enjoy, as contempt for moral squalor denied by
the laissez faire belief in personal choice. The satisfaction retribution
affords can only be admitted by ‘‘the more paranoid part of our super
ego’’ ‘‘in some dark corner of our psyche’’ (Bottiroli 26), and does not
offer itself within the movie as a solution to the systemic problems it
exposes. John Doe, an alien inhabiting a liberal democracy, uncovers
the bleak realization that the best its laws can do is to protect us from
one another; they only proscribe, they do not transform human nature,
and they do not make us good.

Notes
1. Se7en chapter 33. I quote from Walker’s published script unless the phrasing of the screen
version makes the same point more emphatically, as it does here. With thanks to departmental
colleagues including psychologist Sondra Leftoff, to the Saturday Medieval Group ( Jennifer
Brown, Glenn Burger, Matthew Goldie, Steven Kruger, Michael Sargent, Sylvia Tomasch), and
particularly to Bettina Bildhauer for their comments; also to Gary Zaragovitch for help with
image editing. I have updated the bibliography for the essay, originally accepted in 2007, to
reflect recent publications, although revision of the argument is sparing.
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2. The distinction between crime and sin does not map precisely onto the complex and evolving
distinction between medieval secular and spiritual courts. The latter had jurisdiction over its
own personnel, even if a cleric had committed a felony. Some sins, of course, were amendable
by penance, and others punishable by church law.
3. For a queer subtext in the movie, most especially a queer desire between Mills and Doe, see
Flannery.
4. Armour (6 – 11). See also Singleton (2:522 – 25). Armour (15) understands contrapasso to apply
only to infernal punishments in which the sinners have done to them in return what they did
in life; not to antithetical punishments in which sinners undergo the reversal of their sin.
Morrison, however, understands the term loosely to mean punishment that ‘‘either resembles
the sin or contrasts with it’’ (6).
5. Walker 74 – 75. ‘‘He’s a nutbag’’ comes from Se7en chapter 20.
6. In contrast to the more logically rigorous syllogism, the ‘‘rhetorical proof’’ of forensic oratory is
the enthymeme, which is only probably not necessarily true. Aristotle I.9, 1368a (104 – 05).
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